Interview with Kristijan Krkač

I am pleased to publish an interview with Kristijan Krkač, a philosopher from Croatia.

1. Dear Kristijan, can you describe how you became interested in philosophy, and your training for that academic field?

First of all, Srećko thanks for this opportunity to say something almost private, yet in my opinion somewhat important for a professional job. 

My interest in philosophy started, as I have been told when I was 2-3 years old. This belongs to my personal idiosyncratic mythology. I wasn’t very talkative, so my parents thought I have some kind of problem. I was mainly sitting somewhere around my parent’s house on the hills above Zagreb looking around observing plants, a cat, a dog, a canary (as well as the cat). My grandfather defended me by allegedly saying: “Leave the kid alone; don’t you see that he is thinking.” So, they left me alone. 

Later on, at the beginning of high school in the Marxism textbook (this was in 1985) I saw a few lines from Wittgenstein’s TLP and I thought – This must be an extremely disturbed person. However, I cut the part of the page with the quotes and kept it with me for years. 

At the beginning of the 1990s, I started studying philosophy at the Jesuit College in Zagreb. I wasn’t very much interested in philosophy, but I was good at it. Fortunately enough I met Professor Ivan Macan SJ, an expert in Wittgenstein’s philosophy and epistemology, and I became his student, later on a friend, and finally a colleague and successor on courses Analytic Philosophy, Epistemology, and on the seminar Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. 

The training was another story. By Macan, but also by some other older professors we were educated in the scholastic method of analysis and argumentation, i.e. in a problem approach to philosophy. In practice, there were disputations presented in a series of theses (especially by professor M. Belić). At the same time I was trained in analytic philosophy by Macan, especially in Wittgenstein, but also encouraged to read a lot of other stuff (like classics, but also Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger). My BA thesis was in Merleau-Ponty’s concept of space and spatiality in his Phenomenology of Perception, my MA was in Moore and Wittgenstein on an external world (on Moore’s Proof and Wittgenstein’s OC), and my Ph.D. thesis was on Wittgenstein’s work On Certainty (OC in 2003). 

During more than a decade I had weekly meetings with Macan in which we discussed first and foremost Wittgenstein, but also other stuff (other philosophers, my working papers, music, history, culture, art, science, mine, and his private matters, sometimes like confessions, he always asked me are my parents, my family, friends OK, and similar). 

Basically, my training was a combination of scholastic method, analytic method, and a kind of Wittgensteinian morphology (Macan often asked me: “Don’t you see, don’t you see the pattern here?” “Look closely!”). Of course, besides spending a lot of time simply laughing at various jokes (religious and others) we always spend some time in silence (a kind of examen). I was teaching at Jesuit College from 1996 to 2017. In 2003 I started teaching at Zagreb School of Economics and Management where I still teach courses Introduction to Philosophy, Critical Thinking, and Business Ethics, CSR, and Sustainability.

2. How have you integrated your research into your work as professor (you can highlight your books/articles here)?

Contrary to other philosophers, I like to present my newly published materials (in philosophy and in business ethics), but always with a particular goal concerning the level of study and the syllabus of the course. I was trained not to talk on a formal occasion such as a symposium if I didn’t have previously published material at least connected to my topic, because “consistency (if it is possible) and expertise are important”. I authored, edited, and co-edited a series of textbooks and introductions in philosophy and business ethics, so basically some of my ideas from articles are incorporated there (for the list of my publications one can check my Google Scholar account, my Croatian Scientific Bibliography account, but also Filozofija.org website where some of my e-books are published, and my full CV and bibliography is available on Scribd). Generally speaking, I am very careful concerning the incorporation of my published materials into my lectures as said depending on various circumstances. 

However, I would like to mention something else related to your question. Lecturing on a topic before publishing and after it are two different things. Lecturing before publishing is a part of research and questions, objections, and replies if there are such are an indispensable part of the research process. In published papers, I often like to thank people who participated in such discussions, as well as those who participated in informal discussions apart from anonymous reviewers who also, if they are good, contribute to the final version of the article. In a way, every paper, even in humanities and even if it is authored by one person it is a product of many. Lecturing after the publication on the other hand is a different sort of thing. It should summarize the results and then the important idea surfaces slowly to the light, namely, either the corrections of the previously published research or continuation of the research in some new direction. The first possibility I did with my treatment of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the so-called duck-rabbit head or as I coined the word “Dubbit”. I published 4 versions of the research in a period of more than 10 years in which every new version corrected some mistakes from the previous one.

If I may add something here which is surely off-topic it would be my experience as a reviewer in various international philosophical journals, associate editor at Social Responsibility Journal, a section editor in a few encyclopedias, and similar because this experience showed me that even a philosophical work is in fact in 99% of the time already incorporated into a community of experts who basically make the initial ideas much better in their final form of published material. A good reviewer is something that cannot be replaced by anything else.   

3. How has the field you work in changed since you have started as a student?

Generally, internationally, and globally it didn’t change much. What was dominant at the beginning of the 1990s is still dominant at the beginning of the 2020s. So far, the 21^st century in the global or at least Western philosophy is a simple continuation of what was going on in the 20^th century. No new ideas, new directions, analyses, schools, etc. Some things changed. For instance, some studies of philosophy around the world have been shut down. Philosophers turned to more popular topics such as philosophy of music, philosophy of sports, philosophy of film, etc. (me included on these three topics). However, in most cases these popular philosophies aren’t as good as a philosopher or a fan of a popular topic would imagine. 

A few things changed in my small national philosophical community, and I believe the similar happened in some other countries in a similar situation. Compared to the beginning of the 1990s, nowadays younger generations of philosophers, at least some percentage of them, strive to publish in very good international journals and to be internationally recognized which is excellent. At the beginning of the 1990s I remember hearing about some “old” Croatian philosophers that they are excellent and that they are experts on this or that (say, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger, etc.) but I never saw their papers in the best international journals for these philosophers or schools of philosophy.

I remember the words of professor Macan after one symposium on philosophy and religion at the beginning of the 1990s: “Connect with the international community. There is nothing here for you. Nothing good.” So I did. Therefore, in a way, my field changed locally (nationally) at least in part, but globally it seems to be still good old 20th-century philosophy. Of course, philosophy of language isn’t the first philosophy anymore, Wittgenstein scholarly research “crossed the Styx” and become a sublime object of extremely detailed exegesis, and business ethics transformed to CSR, and nowadays to sustainability and “everything green” but surprisingly enough, corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) still plays a huge part in the global economy and business regardless of hundreds of business ethicists around the world.    

4. From the perspective of your research and your own way of thinking, which, in your opinion, are the main issues someone encounters in the process of learning how to think properly?

Since I answered previous questions a bit extensively, I will keep these answers sharp, short, and completely unclear. Thinking is hard for most people. It is so because they are taught to think in the wrong way. Thinking is going on all the time; sometimes in the shadows and sometimes explicitly. The problem is that we need to think critically. This means to use (on a daily basis) rational tools of thinking, such as logic, argumentation, evidence gathering, checking, drawing correct conclusions, etc., and last but not least imagination and courage to talk critically in public regardless of consequences because this is what makes us not so much scientists, philosophers and similar, rather normal human beings. Because thinking and imagination are what brought us here in the 20^th century, irrationality always draws us back to some early or even pre-human stages of “Naturgeschichte” of anatomically modern humans. In short, think critically every day on each and every occasion, because if you don’t, you will lose this ability, and have the courage to speak in a critical manner publically, because if you don’t, then your ability will have no purpose. 

5. People often disagree on different things. Is there a way of learning how to listen to, and ultimately, understand the people you do not share intellectual common ground with? if you wish, you can answer as a Wittgensteinian 🙂 

Disagreement is normal and it is fruitful on many occasions because it can lead to the confrontation of various “language-games”, “practices”, and even “forms of life”, but also to find the best solution to various practical problems that we as humans encounter on daily basis as individuals, cultures, societies, and civilizations. 

I write these answers in extremely sad and cruel times in which that Moscow idiot and his around 200 closest associates command war crimes during the invasion of Ukraine. Now, I cannot see myself finding “a common ground” that would deny this invasion and occupation, and war crimes that are obviously committed on a daily basis. However, if one accepts this as a minimum of being fair to the facts, then we have a common ground. This seems like a practical more than an intellectual issue, but look at it closely; isn’t it a simple case of denying and acknowledging the facts? How can one share a common ground with someone else who deliberately denies the facts, lies, and falsifies all kinds of stuff (history, present situation, etc.)?

Clear concepts, checked evidence, precise arguments, and consistent conclusions are what should rule our thinking regardless of our agreement or disagreement because then we have a kind of useful common measure. Otherwise, we do not have a common ground and we can choose between silence, trying conversion of the other side to our Lebensform (on the way to Damascus), and confrontation. Each way of proceeding has its own advantages and disadvantages. In short, “Clarity is an end in itself” as Wittgenstein would say, and if one doesn’t accept clarity (in our thoughts and actions as much as it is humanly possible to us) as the bottom line, then one should perhaps instead of philosophy try art, poetry, science or similar.     

6. It occurs somehow, especially in the Croatian context, that many people who are formally philosophers (by this I mean the holders of PhD degrees) do not publish enough, or publish barely a few articles during their academic careers. In your opinion, what would be the reason for this? 

Yes, this is a fact. I measured it a few years ago, and it was a fact back then. Now, the reason is a different story. First, they were never philosophically brought up in this culture of daily work, and constant publishing, especially in high-quality international journals or at least trying to do so. Second, the formal rules for scientific advancement at least in humanities and in philosophy in Croatia are so low that almost anybody with a Ph.D. in time can become a full professor with an academic tenure track. Last but not least, I think that the vast majority of contemporary Croatian philosophers given that previous reasons are right are simply lazy, not original enough, and perhaps not talented for philosophy at all. However, they are where they are, paid by the state, and they do what they do, which in a certain not small percentage is close to nothing. However, who am I to comment on the fact that the state of 3.8 million citizens needs 7 studies of philosophy and more than (as some remarked to me recently) 200 philosophers?    

7. What are underworked areas and topics in need of further academic research?

I don’t know. Some things should be repeated in every generation, such as critical thinking, especially in times such as these. Other things should encourage originality, creativity, imagination, and freedom of thought. I mean, I cannot speak of other areas even in humanities not to mention sciences, but I can have my say in philosophy. Namely, it seems OK if someone likes science or poetry, as Rorty would say, but this doesn’t mean that Carnap or Heidegger or for that matter Quine or Gadamer should be the cornerstones of our philosophy. What we have learned from Wittgenstein for example is that originality and creativity are the most important aspects of philosophical thinking. Chewing old texts from the history of philosophy is fine, but the history of philosophy is more a part of history than a part of philosophy. Writing crazy stuff supposedly based on some contemporary philosophy is also fine, but if it rests on wrong reading, false explication of a text, and bad analyses and arguments, then, as I said previously, perhaps one should try a seminar on creative writing rather than Philosophy 101.

Contemporary philosophy gave birth to something like an industry of publishing papers that have 0 downloads, and 0 citations, an industry that will eventually kill and eat its own child, philosophy itself. Let me finish as I have started. It happened to me on a few occasions, but the first one was extremely funny. Namely, my teacher, professor Macan, said that I should write a Ph.D. thesis proposal as well as a formal essay on 5-10 pages in English. Then he gathered similar books and paper and checked my proposal, and finally said: “Well, originality is extremely important for a Ph.D. thesis, and your proposal, that Wittgenstein was a kind of pragmatist, is by all means original. However, it sounds completely crazy to me. OK, you can do it.” So, I did it. And, more than a decade later, this topic became one of the legitimate explications of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Of course, this was my lucky guess. But, I had a kind of a strong hunch that this was the right direction of the analysis, and I still do, no matter if someday it turns out wrong. So, in short, besides originality also a kind of intellectual courage to try, to fail, to correct a mistake, to try again, fail again. The goal will eventually reveal itself. The way is important.      

Soisalon-Soininen Volume Published

via Soisalon-Soninen Volume Published

Interview with Barbara Hallensleben

I am pleased to publish an interview with Barbara Hallensleben, a specialist for Dogmatic Theology, and Ordentliche Professorin [the chair of Dogmatics, Faculty of Theology] at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland.

• Dear Barbara, can you describe how you became interested in theology, and your training for that academic field?

I became interested in theology during the last classes in school (before the high-school diploma) where I received an excellent religious education. We dealt with a broad spectrum of both philosophical questions and critical approaches to contemporary developments that included analyzing Christian literature of the 20th century as well as spiritual and mystical topics. In that way, I became acquainted with theology as a reflection not only on “religious” questions but also as a way to a comprehensive view of the world, nature, community, history from the perspective of faith.

First, I completed my studies in Münster, combining the full formation in theology with studies of philosophy and history. It was a great fortune that I was invited to live in the household of Prof. Erwin Iserloh to whom I became assistant a little bit later. I learned from him not only about the ecumenical orientation of theology but also how to approach Church history as a history of thought that includes all facets of politics, philosophy, art, and culture. This kind of theology has remained important to me until today.

Since the beginning of my studies, I also had the opportunity to follow the colloquia of Professor emeritus Josef Pieper, who opened up a lively approach to the thinking of Thomas Aquinas. That also helped me during my doctorate studies on anthropology and the doctrine of grace in Thomas de Vio Cajetan under the supervision of Prof. Iserloh. Cajetan did not only write the first complete commentary on the Summa theologiae by Thomas Aquinas, but was also the first representative of “Rome” to interrogate Martin Luther in Augsburg in 1518, and saw in his doctrine on a self-reflexive “certitude of faith” the foundation of a “new Church”.

My special interest in dogmatics already grew in Münster under the inspiration of Prof. Peter Hünermann, with whom I later wrote my habilitation thesis on the theology of mission in Ignatius von Loyola and Mary Ward in Tübingen. At that time I was not yet sure whether I wanted to take up an academic career. But it happened when in 1994 I was appointed to the chair of dogmatics at the University of Fribourg Switzerland. In this task, I am really happy and I feel able to combine profession and vocation.

• How have you integrated your research interests into your work as professor (you can highlight your books/articles here)?

In addition to the focus on history and theology of the Reformation, which I took over from Prof. Iserloh, the focus on “Eastern Churches” was added during my habilitation. There was a kairos due to the European political turn in 1989: Access to the Eastern Churches – with all the opportunities and difficulties – was now possible again in the direct encounter, not just by studying books. A great experience for me was the participation in the secretariat of the first European Ecumenical Assembly “Peace with Justice” 1989 in Basel. Delegations of Orthodox Christians from Eastern Europe were also involved – not without great efforts. During the “Pilgrimage of three countries”, about 5000 participants could cross open borders from Basel/Switzerland to France, then to Germany and back to Switzerland. Many Eastern Europeans had tears in their eyes. A few months later the Berlin Wall fell. It has been shown convincingly that peaceful protests of Christians in the German Democratic Republic, some of whom also had been delegates in Basel, played a decisive role in this turning point. The “Institute for Eastern Churches” in Regensburg/Germany and his director Mons. Nicholas Wyrwoll with whom I worked in Basel, became our mentor to build up a similar Centre of teaching and research at the University of Fribourg.

My special discovery is the Russian Orthodox theologian Sergij Bulgakov (1871-1944), who developed from a convinced Marxist to a theologian and wrote his extensive theological work in exile in Paris. His “Sophiology”, which remains controversial in the Orthodox world, made me discover the “blind spots” of the Western philosophical and theological thought. Bulgakov is read today precisely where ways out of the crisis of modern thinking are being sought. In Fribourg, we are preparing a commented German translation of Bulgakov’s works. At least 20 volumes are to be expected. It is not exaggerated to call Bulgakov one of the best theologians of the 20th century, even if German-speaking theology has hardly discovered him yet.

When you ask about “my books”, I will gladly answer with a variation of a word of the apostle Paul: “You are my books”, “you”, that are my students, especially my doctoral students. Since I do not see at present a clear consensus in the field of theology, I prefer not to multiply the voices even more, but to bring the precious contributions of past and present into dialogue, often transversely to what everyone takes for granted. In the research results of my doctoral students, there is much of what has become important to me – also through them. If I will have the opportunity to complete the edition of Bulgakov’s works, among them a precious dogmatical synthesis, then I consider it more important than writing my own dogmatics.

• How has the field (you work in) changed since you have started as a student?

When I started my studies, the situation in Münster was very polarized. The still unfinished reception of the Second Vatican Council, the aftermath of the authority-critical ‘68 movement, the challenges of liberation theology, feminist theology, autonomous morality, questions of inculturation in a worldwide perspective – all these currents were signs of fundamental upheaval. At that time it was almost inevitable to present your own thought by agreeing with one specific “school” or “group” and by thinking “against someone”.

The agitations of my student days are partly settled, but mainly they have become more serious and diverse: the interreligious dialogue is socially relevant, new debates about the scope of the “secular world” have begun, the reform of the Church is looking for more credible forms of community, the ecological crisis provokes a change of lifestyle, the great promises of modernity are no longer sustainable in view of the misery of refugees, increased violence and corruption and the excessive charges in relation to the crises of our contemporary world.

In this situation, the change to Fribourg in Switzerland enormously broadened my horizon: The bilingualism of the university, the international professorship, in recent years also the denominationally plural composition of the students, help to a much more attentive theology in constant dialogue and with the readiness to make one’s own thoughts understandable also in other contexts. A simple example: When I initially asked colleagues to help me with the translation of my German lectures or conference contributions into French, the reaction was often: “Your texts cannot be translated …” Today I try to speak and write with the constant inner attention whether my ideas could potentially become meaningful also in other languages. I perceive intensively how in other languages essential theological developments take place that enriches my way of doing theology. And as a theologian coming from Germany I have long since stopped thinking that “German theology” is the center of the (theological) world.

• To what extent is it possible to speak about the interaction of traditions if we take into account the complexity of studying theology from different perspectives?

The first insight from the above-mentioned complexity is that no one can say the whole truth in one tradition and in one language and system of concepts. No one who speaks the truth is the truth – except Jesus Christ himself. Through this insight, theology becomes more humble. Of course, no one can be in exchange with all possible dialogue partners. We must choose and, where we begin a dialogue, we must conduct it seriously and truthfully. It is important to me that theology does not put any fundamental limits on its ability to dialogue. According to Thomas, theology deals with God and with all things from the point of view that they refer to God. This does by no means only or even primarily include the world of religions. The early Christians rather sought the conversation with philosophy. Bulgakov developed his theology in the discussion with economics. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben started as a lawyer and shows how strongly the political philosophy of Western modernity is shaped by theological categories. Especially, theology must not be reduced to a moral source of motivation. It should always be involved in working on a comprehensive world view, even if it always goes beyond this task and leads to the joy and to the praise of the glory of God.

• To what extent it is possible to put into conversation confessional and academic interpretation of theological claims?

This question is actually outdated, even academically. We know today that science without presuppositions is not possible. Theology belongs to the eminently critical sciences because it constantly thematizes and questions its own constitution. If our secular world is not to lead into a “negative secularity” which excludes all confessions from the public sphere, then it must contribute to “positive secularity”. This requires a platform on which “normative claims” can enter into a peaceful exchange in mutual respect and agree on how to live together in peace and justice. Here confessional traditions can make a decisive contribution.

During the next semester, I will offer a seminar on the “non-secularizable content of the Christian faith”, including the study of texts by Jürgen Habermas. Habermas suggests that Christians can share their position within society by translating it into a secular language. In the seminar, we will try to clarify how to deal with the non-secularizable contents of the faith, from prayer up to the confession of the Triune God. Conceptual discourses are not enough, what is needed here is a credible form of communal life, called “Church”.

• What, in your opinion, are underworked areas and topics in need of further academic research?

Every topic of theology must be discussed anew in every generation and be acquired in thinking, living, and acting. The interaction of Church life with the respective contemporary horizon brings up new questions because Christians are always at the same time citizens of their world. At present the following questions seem to me to be particularly important: The pandemic measures have triggered a strong wave of digitalization and “virtualization” of our life-world, combined with “social distancing”. The fellow human being now appears primarily under the aspect of the “danger of infection”. This cannot leave the Church as the “body of Christ” untouched, because “infection with grace” also happens bodily, has to be “incarnated”. Here theology must help the Church to draw lessons that also help society to put the new technical possibilities into the service of an incarnated form of life.

I am concerned about the tendency of theology to put the “religious” question at the center of attention and to regard religious studies as the preferred interlocutor. This option only reinforces the isolation of theology within the sciences, which in modern times have gradually declared themselves “autonomous”. Now, this autonomy has proved to be an illusion, starting with the natural sciences, which had to give up the idea of a “determined” nature structured according to fixed laws. The same applies to political philosophy, which developed in the West against denominationally fragmented Christianity and gave rise to political regimes that now find themselves overwhelmed by global challenges. As well, we see an economic science that can no longer be restricted to a technique of profit maximization, not caring for the victims, and jurisprudence, that cannot constitute the last authority for seeking “justification” and “redemption”. Here the presence of the Church and of theology is anew demanded, not in a triumphalist way but in genuine solidarity. This witness always includes the surplus of joy, gratitude, and hope which testify to the “open heaven”. One of the most important tasks today is new attention to language. Actually, language is often trivialized and used for manipulation. The language of theology as well as of the Church often seems powerless and empty. How do we speak when we know that language reflects the eternal Logos? It is not by chance that the doctrine of analogy is at present being rediscovered in the English-speaking world: “Univocal” language easily becomes power-shaped, while the analogous approach to reality remains modest and ready to listen in view of the difference between the assertion and what has been said. Language is a kind of “sacrament”, and sacraments need a mystagogical approach.

• Following the previous question, are there areas and topics the Church still did not give a theological/confessional answer to?

I appreciate the position of the Orthodox Church on the question of official Church “answers” and “teachings”. Orthodox Christians emphasize that only what is essential for salvation should be doctrinally defined. This is also an ecumenically significant position: As long as we can pray the creed(s) of the early Church together, we should open theological questions for discussion and recognize them in different languages, conceptual expressions, and ways of life without breaking communion with one another.

What needs to be clarified or at least deepened in the current context is probably the question of theological anthropology in relation to the gender difference. Christian doctrine includes the creation of the human being in the image and likeness of God. Is the distinction between man and woman a theologically relevant sign that should be included in the sacramental order of the Church? Or can we neglect this question because it is simply a trick of nature to produce offspring? Not only the sacrament of Orders depends on the answer to this question, but also many aspects of the theology of marriage and sexual morality. I cannot give definite answers, but I am surprised that the question is not asked with greater commitment.

• How do you see the future of theology in Europe?

“Europe” – though always on the global horizon – has been a theological topic for me since my participation in the European Ecumenical Assembly “Peace with Justice” 1989 in Basel. Europe has been the starting point of many global problems: from Church division to colonization, from economic exploitation to the debt crisis. Europe should therefore also become the starting point for reconciliation and for life perspectives for the whole of humankind. I do not expect anything from the present “political” Europe. It is a community of benefit, which easily falls apart again into national self-interest in the face of trials and tribulations such as the current migration challenge.

My small personal contribution is situated in my academic field: In the “Institute for Ecumenical Studies” and in the “Study Centre for Eastern Churches”, we try to develop theology as a learning community of different Christian traditions (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Old Oriental, Free Church, Evangelical, Anglican). Here, also different experiences from the “common house of Europe” can be experienced. That is a demanding, but the fruitful and promising task, because you can see how young theologians become responsible actors beyond their individual, national, or denominational perspective.

9) What current projects are you working on?

My central research project is and will remain the complete edition of the works of the Russian theologian Sergij Bulgakov and the promotion of the reception of his Sophiology. In general, “translating” became my passion. In my lectures, I try to “translate” good old Catholic doctrine into answers to fundamental questions of a coherent world view. At present, I am translating from Italian to German time-critical contributions by the philosopher Giorgio Agamben for the NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung). Next planned is the translation of the new document on the Church’s social doctrine from an Orthodox perspective, initiated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, after I have already translated and published the documents of the Panorthodox Synod in Crete 2016 and the official Church documents on the Ukrainian crisis. After having published a biography translated from English about Jerome of Prague, who was burned as a heretic at the Council of Constance in 1416, I would now also like to prepare a volume with translations of his original texts; this will shed light on exciting philosophical and theological developments of the pre-Reformation period. There are over 30 other publication projects on my waiting list. The only way to avoid despair is: One step at a time! When impatience grows, you can always transform the painful limits of time and working capacity into a proof of God’s eternal perfection!

Charting the Mid-Second Century: Apostolic Christians, Gnostic, Rabbinic Jews…

Within the framework of the Hebrew, Jewish, and Early Christian Studies Seminar, on the 11th of May Peter J. Tomson from the University of Leuven gave a paper in which he described ways of mapping the second century CE which is as enigmatic as it is crucial. At the very beginning, Tomson accentuated that many important but poorly documented developments during the second century CE have to do with the relationship between Jews and Christians, as also with other ‘sects’ or ‘schools’ that sprang up around them in this period, but it is far from evident exactly how. The crucial point in dealing with the second century CE, Tomson claimed, is how to deal with uncertainty, arguing that one way of doing that is to soberly distinguish between what we do know and what we don’t.

After raising the caveats, Tomson dealt with ‘locating the unknowns’. He was inspired by the language of ‘knowns’ and ‘unknowns’, and more particularly of ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’, which was made famous by the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2002 when he tried to convince his audience that the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’ justified another war against Iraq. Rumsfeld evoked, Tomson claimed,
not only the ‘known unknowns’ but also the ‘unknown unknowns’ he considered the more tricky ones. Tomson used that vocabulary to describe issues with depicting the second century. The question is: Can a story of second-century Christianity be told?

There are several things from the second-century we know about. We know about the Great Revolt of 66-70 Ce and its aftermath, the emergence of a modest rabbinic movement developing the Pharisaic tradition of learning. We also know about communities of Christians who experienced exclusion from Jewish leaders as well as occasional persecutions from Roman administrators, and about their writings during that period. We also have a reasonable image of the Apostolic Church in the metropoles with its bishops, about their liturgy and the reading of the Gospels next to the Scriptures these communities took over from the Jews, and we know of early schools as well as severe struggles with the haireseis. Information about these haireseis came mainly from their adversary, the Apostolic Church, until it was supplemented by the Nag Hammadi library.  We also have knowledge about the Diaspora Revolt under Trajan and the Bar Kokhba War under Hadrian. Tomson argued that a sequence of three successive wars was a complete exception in the Roman empire, and that they should be studied together. Tomson backed up his argument with researches by Horbury and Goodman.

After depicting issues, Tomson moved to charting strategies of how to find ways to understand the second-century CE. He proposed two strategies:

The first one is diachronic and consists in tracing significant developments affecting Jews, Christians, and other ‘schools’, especially around the middle of the century. The combined result will be a longitudinal cross-section of sorts. Main queries here are: when does a given phenomenon appear in our sources, when could it have begun to develop, and how do the various development tracks compare – where do they align or diverge?
The second strategy is a synchronic inquiry into Irenaeus’ ‘heresiology’. It aims to
examine how he positions the various ‘schools’ and his own ‘Apostolic Church’ in
comparison with one another and with the more fundamental adversary in the background, rabbinic Judaism. As observed by Robert Wilken (1971), the relation to the Jews and their Scriptures is always there for the Church Fathers, also when not explicitly mentioned.

In the final section of the paper, Tomson demonstrated his way of ‘connecting the dots’. Namely, he argued that one should also reckon with the ‘unknown’ or ‘uncharted’ areas where around the mid-second century estranged Jews could met and mingled with heterodox Christians and inspired popular philosophers. For an illustration, we
may think of Justin and Trypho dialoguing in some Stoa in the Diaspora. Perhaps, Tomson suggested, we should see such meetings as a ‘laboratory’ after all, as a mingling of variegated cultural ingredients resulting in very different outcomes. Even if the Dialogue would have a largely fictional character, as is often supposed, its participants are not portrayed as meeting in a historical vacuum. As the war escapee Trypho signals to Justin, theirs was a shaken century.

After Tomson’s observations and methodological suggestions, scholars developed a vivid discussion and stimulating criticism.

Translation Technique in Context (OTP)

In his paper ‘Optimal Translation as a Method for Evaluating Translation Techniques’ (7/5/2020) via Zoom within the framework of the Cambridge Septuagint Series, Jeremy M. Hutton from the University of Wisconsin-Madison outlined both aspects of the Optimal Translation Paradigm (OTP) indebted to OT and aspects of the OTP indebted to LXX Scholarship.

Concerning the first point, Hutton claimed that OTP a priori holds that acts of translation necessarily produce optimally representative products in the target language, and that translation as an act is subject to constraints. The translators seem to have been driven more by intuition and spontaneity, and in that sense, what is often called translation technique merely describes the effects of the translator’s work rather than the system used by the translator. Consequently, our data set consists of two types of texts. First, our main body of evidence comprises demonstrable target texts. Second, we have to concern ourselves with a presumed source text, which must be triangulated from the extant textual witnesses.

Regarding the second point, Hutton argued that OTP indebted to LXX scholarship is a process-oriented course of study that attempts to uncover the cognitive process(es) underlying the translator’s work. The methods involved in the production-oriented variety of Optimal Translation are necessarily helical.

After meticulously presenting his approach and concerns, Hutton applied them to the example of 2 Sam 9:1 comparing Hebrew, Syriac, and Greek version.

MT: ויאמר דוד הכי יש עוד אשר נותר לבית שאול ואעשה עמו חסד בעבור יהנתן

P: ܘܐܡܪ ܕܘܝܕ ܐܝܬ ܟܝ ܐܢܫ ܕܐܫܬܚܪ ܡܢ ܕܒܝܬ ܫܐܘܠ ܐܥܒܕ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܪܚܡܐ ܡܜܠ ܝܘܢܬܢ

LXX: Καὶ εἶπεν Δαυιδ Εἰ ἔστιν ἔτι ὑπολελειμμένος τῷ οἴκῳ Σαουλ καὶ ποιήσω μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἔλεος ἕνεκεν Ιωναθαν.

To support his approach, Hutton examined the degree of literacy of lexical choices in P and LXX as well as their translation technique. His suggestions were further examined, discussed, supported, and criticized by other Septuagint scholars and students. It was a fruitful meeting.